Moral thinking

This thesis sets out to develop a theory of moral thinking soundly based on formal foundations. Part 1 examines the most notable attempt to develop such a theory in R. M. Hare’s Moral Thinking (1981). The thesis examines Hare’s claim to have found the foundations of moral thinking in moral language and in the prudential account of moral motivation. I examine Hare’s claim that his is an entirely formal, neutral account of the canons of moral reasoning and whether in fact he introduces substantive assumptions into his account, which lead him to claim that moral prescriptions are merely expressions of preferences; that the only relevant non-moral facts are those relating to preferences; and that critical moral thinking must assume a preference utilitarian form. Beyond this the focus falls on three key elements of Hare’s theory: what it is ‘to know’ in the sense required by his theory, his concept of rationality as prudence, and his theory of representation. All three are key elements in Hare’s strategy of tackling moral conflicts by converting interpersonal problems into intrapersonal ones settled by prudential calculations aimed at maximizing preference satisfaction. However, this leaves us with the problem of valuing: that often what we prefer to do is not what we think we ought to do, and what we ought to do is not what we prefer to do. Part 2 sets out to solve these problems by outlining the foundations of an alternative two-level theory of critical moral thinking based on our rational natures alone. It outlines the formal underpinnings of this theory in a principle of absolute value from which are developed three non-overridable principles (universalism, dignity of the individual and autonomy) which determine the formal nature of moral prescriptions. This theory not only avoids the problems raised by Hare’s, but allows for the development of a theory of valuing.