In the shadow of McClellan: the Army of the Potamac and the struggle for high command 1861-1863

This thesis examines how the Union struggled to achieve an effective high command during the first two years of the American Civil War. In particular, it looks at the Union high command through the lens of General McClellan and with a focus on the Union’s main army, the Army of the Potomac. Much of the Union’s military attention in the first two years of the war was focused on the eastern theatre where General McClellan commanded the Army of the Potomac. McClellan intended to defeat the Confederacy by capturing Richmond. This failed and he was eventually sacked by President Lincoln. McClellan’s sacking provoked a revolt among senior officers in the Army of the Potomac which sought to return McClellan to command. This revolt is often overlooked by historians but it reveals much about the failure of the Union to establish a system of high command. Although the literature on the Civil War is vast, the Union’s high command and Union strategy has been neglected in favour of the study of battles and generals. What literature there is on the Union’s high command has been examined from Lincoln’s perspective. This thesis takes the fresh approach of examining the Union’s high command through the perspective of McClellan. Adopting a chronological approach, the thesis explores whether the Union had the high command in place to provide the framework for victory. It draws on secondary sources but relies heavily on primary sources, in particular the Official Records and the Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. By bringing a fresh approach and interpreting the sources with fresh eyes I will be broadening and deepening our understanding of why the Union was not able to achieve victory in the first two years of the war and moving the debate over the Union’s leadership in the Civil War into new areas.