Universalism, liberalism and value pluralism

This paper seeks to deal with the challenges which non-liberal values and practices, particularly religious ones, raise for contemporary liberal democracies. As a means to this end, it focuses on the latest ramifications of the Danish Cartoons Affair and the capacity of various schools of thought within contemporary political philosophy to provide a way forward on this issue. One of the obvious features of the direct confrontation between faith-based outlooks and more secular positions within contemporary liberal democracies is the gulf of incommensurability that often divides the two, with neither side being able to advance arguments which are reasonable or understandable within the terms of the other. I define such a confrontation as a “clash of world views” (it being a narrower, and slightly less contentious, concept than a “clash of civilizations”). Such a “clash” occurs when each side believes “ultimate” issues to be at stake, since in such contexts, neither can concede ground to the other without also conceding something definitive (and therefore non-negotiable) in their own world view. As Jürgen Habermas tells us: “Unlike theories, worldviews have the power to structure a whole life.” (Habermas 2003a, p. 227). Not everyone possesses such a “world view”, but those that do are liable to see certain issues as being fundamental to the integrity of the world view itself, and so of the first and last importance, on which no concession can be given. It is around these issues that a “clash” is possible, often in the most agonistic terms, endangering liberalism’s basic rules of civil coexistence in the process.