The Freedom of Association Protocol: a localised non-judicial grievance mechanism for workers’ rights in global supply chains

The Freedom of Association Protocol (the 'Protocol') is a multi-party agreement created by Indonesian trade unions, factory owners (‘suppliers’) and global brand-owning companies (‘brands’), including Nike, Adidas, Puma, Pentland and New Balance. It was developed in the context of a long-running global campaign to persuade sportswear brands to uphold workers’ rights in their supply chains. Although institutionally fragile, the Protocol is highly unusual among the non-judicial mechanisms we studied in that it has resulted in significant improvements in respect for trade union rights in a number of factories that we investigated. For example in one such factory trade union leaders who had been subject to violent intimidation (including the use of electric shocks) were able to use the Protocol’s processes to draw attention to their situation and are now able to freely organise and negotiate regarding factory conditions with managers in that factory. In some cases trade union activity associated with the operation of the Protocol has also resulted in improved implementation of legal minimum wage increases in factories supplying participating brands, bringing significant benefits to workers in the factories involved. Worker representatives have also been active decision-makers and participants in the design, dissemination, implementation and governance of the Protocol. This has contributed to relatively high levels of local stakeholder ownership of the Protocol compared with other initiatives studied in this project. Achieving local participation has required a flexible approach, significant commitment of time and resources and would not have been possible without a skilled third party facilitator to maintain ongoing engagement by all parties. Notwithstanding these achievements, the Protocol has a number of limitations. While a number of brands and suppliers have exhibited significant commitment to the Protocol process, its implementation has been far from uniform. Although in some factories the terms of Protocol have been incorporated into collective bargaining agreements, at this stage the Protocol is primarily viewed as a non-binding initiative and many suppliers appear to be resisting its full implementation in their workplaces. Without sustained monitoring, particularly from international labour rights networks (whose history of labour rights campaigning targeting the sportswear sector laid the groundwork for the Protocol), the incentives for some brands to stay involved and to persuade their suppliers to continuously improve compliance may diminish. There is also significant frustration among the unions that the brands are refusing to negotiate further protocols on living wages and job security, insisting instead that further work needs to be done on implementing what has been agreed in relation to freedom of association. Despite these limitations, the Protocol represents an important, albeit imperfect, innovation. Our report on the Protocol, available at corporateaccountabilityresearch.net/, makes a number of recommendations for strengthening its effectiveness.