Aristotellian ethics & Habermasian critical theory: a conjoined force for proportionism in ethical discourse & Roman Catholic moral theology

In an earlier article (cf. Lovat, 2003), I posited proportionism as an ethical and moral theological approach particularly suited to what was described as a ‘moderately post-scientific age’. The latter was defined as an age “ … that still relies on science yet is more conscious of its limitations and sceptical about its potential to adequately address all of life’s demands and provide all of its answers.” The thesis behind the article was that ethical thought and dilemma arising from such an age is not served well by either the heavily empirical approaches that have tended to dominate much of the field, especially in bioethics, in the past quarter century nor, least of all, by an attempt to return to more dogmatic, science-denying approaches of the past. I presented proportionism as an approach that balanced the imperatives of both of the above approaches in a way that respected time-honoured ethical principles while incorporating a moderated scientific dimension. Above all, I suggested that proportionism, as derived from Aristotle and Aquinas, impelled a way of knowing ethically that was entirely beyond either of the other approaches and that it was this element that made it a particularly appropriate ethical and moral theological mode for the age in which we find ourselves. In regard to this latter, I made especial reference to Roman Catholic moral theology as belonging to a tradition with particular affinity to the approach. Partly in response to the considerable feedback I have received about these ideas, I am attempting in this article to strengthen the claims of proportionism by conjoining the ancient and medieval thought from whence it came with the epistemology of one of the intellectual architects of this ‘moderately post-scientific age’, Jurgen Habermas. Before moving to this point, however, it will be wise to re-capture some of the thought in its entirety.