On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
conference contribution
posted on 2025-05-10, 12:19 authored by Robin Christian, Mike Fellows, Frances Rosamond, Arkadii SlinkoIn this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of "direct democracy" is virtually impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters preferences, since it would require solving a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus of parametrized complexity for this purpose.
History
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Source title
Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC-2006)Name of conference
First International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC-2006)Location
AmsterdamStart date
2006-12-06End date
2006-12-08Editors
Endriss, U. and Lang, J.Publisher
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)Place published
AmsterdamLanguage
- en, English
