In 1871, John Stuart Mill appeared before the Royal Commission on the Administration of the Contagious Diseases. He opposed the acts because they violated the principle of the “security of personal liberty”, not just of prostitutes, their ostensible target, but potentially all women. However, Jeremy Waldron suggests that Mill’s stand poses a puzzle because the “Harm Principle” in On Liberty does not preclude curtailing some liberties to achieve a greater good. Waldron tries to resolve this puzzle by using the fact of Mill’s opposition to the Acts to probe more deeply Mill’s arguments in On Liberty. We take issue with Waldron’s position to argue that his puzzle only emerges if Mill’s commitment to women’s liberty in 1871 is treated as incidental to his 1859 view of liberty. Despite noting Mill’s commitment to women’s rights Waldron inexplicably avoids discussing Mill’s feminist principles and their importance for Mill’s political philosophy. In effect, Waldron’s argument becomes yet another instance of “writing out” feminism from mainstream political theory.
History
Source title
Australian Political Studies Association Annual Conference 2009: Refereed Papers
Name of conference
Australian Political Studies Association Annual Conference 2009 (APSA 2009)